Our paper focuses on the relationship between market concentration and collusion sustainability in a framework of multimarket contacts. We consider two independent and symmetric markets in which a subset of …rms are active in both markets. When …rms are able to transfer market power from one market to another, …rms have strong incentives to collude even in a highly competitive market. This result is relevant for competition policy since assessing market concentration using HHI index could be misleading in some situations.
Introduction
Competition policy traditionally distinguishes between market structures and market behaviors. Concerning the control of market structures, competition authorities focus on the degree of market concentration. For this reason, many concentration indexes have been built as HHI or concentration ratio as CR1, CR3 and so on. Among them, the Hirschmann Her…ndhal Index (HHI) is certainly the most used on market reports. Concerning the control of market behaviors, an academic literature focuses on the distorsive behaviors. 1 However, a few works have study the link between both kinds of market control although it seems that they show strong interactions. It is nevertheless essential to underline these links between market structures and market behaviors in the implementation of competition policy.
In a simple model of price competition repeated game, it can be shown that a decrease in the number of …rms facilitates collusion. This standard result states that little concentrated market structures entails weaker incentives to collude. Consequently, using concentration indexes seems not to be in contradiction with the control of behaviors in markets.
Nevertheless, some works have moderated this result. In some cases, highly concentrated market structures can give strong collusion incentives. For example, Davidson and Denerecke (1984) show that mergers reduce incentives to collude among …rms in the industry. In a similar setting of dynamic price competition with capacity constraints, Brock and Scheinkman (1985) show that collusion incentives are low when the market is highly concentrated or in the contrary when the number of …rm is very important. Last, Compte and al. (2002) show that collusion is more di¢ cult to sustain when concentration creates asymmetries in production capacities. In that case, increasing HHI index induces sometimes strong incentives to collude.
Our paper studies the relationship between market concentration and collusion sustainability in the framework of multimarket contacts literature (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990) ). In this setting, one can show that collusion transfers can be made from a market to another when some …rms are active in both considered markets: i.e. they are in "multimarket contacts". In this case, even in a highly competitive market, …rms could get incentives to collude if they are also supplying customers in less competitive markets. This result is relevant for competition policy since measuring concentration with HHI index could be misleading. It may not encompass the behavioral dimension of competition, especially when multimarket contacts are a key feature of the industry 2 .
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and the benchmark case without multimarket contact. In sections 3 and 4 multimarket contacts among …rms are introduced; in this framework, we analyze if tacit collusion could be transferred from a market to another. Section 5 concludes and gives some implications of results in terms of competition policy. Proofs of Lemma and Propositions are given in an Appendix.
Model

Basic Assumptions
We model two independents markets (A and B) with an identical demand. Goods supplied on these markets are supposed to be homogeneous. Supply is provided by n 1 symmetric …rms in market A, and m 1 in B. Without loss of generality, we assume market B to be always less concentrated than market A that is m > n. In this industry, it exists a subset of k …rms (0 k n) which are active on both markets: we refer to them as multimarket contacts …rms. This con…guration means that these …rms supply the good in both markets A and B.
As it is standard in the analysis of tacit collusion (see Friedman, 1971), we consider an in…nitely repeated Bertrand price competition game. The punishment strategy for a given …rm corresponds to trigger strategy consisting in a reversion to a static competitive equilibrium. We denote p h = 0; 8h = A; B, the individual pro…t gained from a punishment strategy for all active …rms in market h. We denote h represents the individual pro…t gained from deviating from the collusive agreement and corresponds here to the monopolist outcome in market h, we denote h . One can thus determine a threshold for the discount factor denoted h such as:
h , collusion is sustainable in market h. Hereafter, we will consider that market conditions (demand, costs and so on) in markets A and B are identical ; one can write A = B = .
Collusion Incentives without multimarket contact
As a benchmark, we study collusion incentives in the case where multimarket contacts are not possible i.e. k = 0. Because of symmetry among …rms, individual collusive pro…ts are just given by an equal sharing of the monopolistic outcome that is . Then using (1), the critical discount factors in both markets are given by
One can easily link up the incentives to collude (i.e. h ) to the market concentration degree traditionally measured by the Hirschman-Her…ndhal Index (HHI) 4 . In this benchmark case, this index for each market is:
Here 2 [0; 1] represents the common discount factor in both markets. 4 HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each …rm competing in the market and summing Then we can write thresholds for the discount factor as simple linear functions of the respective HHI in each market that is:
It does appear an inverse relationship between the value of these thresholds and HHI's. Clearly on a given market, the lower HHI is, the less sustainable collusion is.
Collusion is then sustainable in both markets if and only if the discount factor in the industry is such that = maxf A ; B g. We call the maximum value for these discount factors as the critical discount factor. In that case, with m > n, the sustainability condition in both markets boils down to = B .
Remark 1 Without multimarket contact among …rms, the HHI test is not con ‡icting with the analysis of tacit collusion A competitive market structure (i.e. a weak HHI level) is linked with pro-competitive behaviors ( B high). This is the conventional wisdom in the …eld of competition policy.
In the following, we study market structures with multimarket contacts and we analyze how such contacts could increase incentives for …rms to collude.
Multimarket Contacts and "Business as Usual"
In this section, we analyze collusion incentives in the industry in the case where some …rms (k > 0) are active in both markets A and B. Here, we consider that coordination to a given collusive agreement allows …rms to keep their customers with respect to the competitive (Bertrand) equilibrium. As a result in case of collusion, market shares are assumed to be "frozen": …rms "in contact" in both markets does not modify the market sharing. In short, a "business as usual" principle applies. Now we have to distinguish three thresholds for the discount factor according to the type of …rm. The factor~ A corresponds to active …rms in the single-market A and~ B corresponds to those active in the single-market B. Last~ represents the discount factor for k active …rms in both markets. Using again relation (1), we obtain easily thresholds for the discount factor for …rms without multimarket contact~
To determine this threshold for each …rm in contact in both markets A and B, the "business as usual" assumption leads to de…ne each …rm's collusive pro…t as the sum of collusive pro…ts on each market. This is due to the fact that market shares remain at their egalitarian competitive levels ( Furthermore, each …rm's deviation pro…t equals twice the monopoly pro…t that is 2 : Hence:
As seen in the section 2, it is easy to write this factor as a function of HHI's in both markets A and B:~
We …nd also the same kind of inverse relation that was previously established between the discount factor and the HHI calculated in each market. One can directly found 5 that~ <~ B as soon as m > n. In that case, the critical discount factor (i.e. maxf~
Therefore, collusion is sustainable in both markets A and B if ~ B 6 .
Remark 2 When "business as usual" applies, multimarket contacts do not constitute a structural factor making easier collusive agreements.
This remark is directly linked to the "business as usual" assumption. Indeed since no direct link exists between markets 7 , collusion transfers from market A towards B can only occur if active …rms in both markets give incentives for "single-market …rms" to collude. Such incentives could be developed if market sharing in case of collusive agreements is modi…ed. In that case, we have to enlarge the framework of our paper relaxing the "business as usual" assumption.
Multimarket contacts and collusion transfers
We eliminate now the assumption of market shares freeze in order to allow active …rms in both markets to transfer their collusive power from a market to another. Firstly, this leads us to de…ne new collusive market shares ; secondly, this allows to calculate the critical discount factor in that case.
Sustainable market shares and critical discount factors
We denote now s A and s B collusive market shares (resp. in market A and B) for a …rm in contact in both markets. These shares are then de…ned by:
where h 2 [0; 1] with h = A; B: This de…nition of market shares simply explains that a given …rm which is in contact on several markets can be encouraged to reduce his market share (from and A represents the opportunity cost that an active …rm in both markets has to bear in order to increase the incentives for other …rms to collude. 5 Indeed e B e = m n 2(nm) > 0. 6 It is important to underline that collusion sustainability in all markets does only depend on the degree of concentration in the market B.
7 Demands in markets A and B are totally independents.
The individual collusive market share A for a single-market …rm in market A (without contact), is de…ned by the linear equation
. Symmetrically, we obtain B = 1 ks B m k for a single-market …rm in B:
As in section 3, we obtain the threshold for the discount factor for active …rms in each single market h = A; B (denoted~ h ) as well as for active …rms in both markets (~ ). The new de…nition (3) of market shares modi…es these thresholds: they do not only depend on market structures (n and m) but also on the number of active …rms in both markets (k). Using relation (1), the threshold for the discount factor for active …rms in the single-market A is then given by:
The expression of this threshold depends on the value of s A . Using (3) one can rewrite it as a function of the market A structure (n):
The threshold for the discount factor for active …rms in the single-market B is de…ned in the same way but is a function of the market B structure (m):
Finally, for …rms with multimarket contacts, the threshold for the discount factor writes:
2 It takes di¤erent values according to the de…nition (3) of market shares s A and s B . Indeed, we have to di¤erentiate between situations where the market shares are "frozen" on a given single market (A or B) and situations where they are simultaneously "frozen" in both markets. More precisely, this threshold rewrites: 
Critical discount factors
In order to determine the sustainability conditions in both markets, it is su¢ cient to analyze the corresponding critical discount factor denoted~ and de…ned by maxf~ ;~ A ;~ B g. Without loss of generality, we proceed the analysis assuming B < A . 
where X ( A ; B ; k) = f(n; m) 2]k;
For each type of …rms (with and without contacts), we have de…ned thresholds~ ,~ A and B for the discount factor. They allow to study incentives to collude for each type of …rms that depend on the values of parameters (n; m; k; A ; B ).
Intuitively, active …rms in the single-market A have more incentives to collude. They are active in the most concentrated market, so the gain derived from a deviation strategy is relatively lower than for …rms supplying single-market B (less concentrated): the deviation pro…t is the same ( ) whereas collusion pro…ts are decreasing with the number of …rms. On the other hand, for active …rms in the single-market B and for …rms with multimarket contacts, the analysis of the incentives to collude is not so obvious. Figure 1 summarizes this analysis in the plane (n; m). More precisely, …gure 1 represents critical discount factors in the plane (n; m) as de…ned in lemma 1. In this …gure, one can see the values of parameters for which active …rms in both markets (respectively without contact in market B) have stronger incentives to deviate (area X(:)) (respectively area Y (:)).
Within area
). In that case, the market B share which is supplied by active …rms in both markets does not depend directly on the number of active …rms in this market since s B = B < 1 m . Incentives to collude for these …rms (i.e.~ ) is therefore independent of the intensity of competition in this market. However, incentives for …rms without contact in market B does depend on m through their market share given by B = 1 k B m k . For a given k , the incentives to collude are higher for active …rms in the single-market B and increase with the concentration of market (low value of m). Consequently, for a low level of concentration in market B (m < m 0 ), the active …rms in both markets have strongest incentives to deviate. Within area X, collusion is then sustainable as ~ =~ .
However, as soon as market A is very competitive (n > A simple comparative statics with respect to the number of …rms with multimarket contacts (k) allows to state the following result.
Proposition 1
The number of …rms with multimarket contacts is a structural factor facilitating collusion in both markets.
When the number of …rms with multimarket contacts (k) is increasing, the area X is expanding but the area Y is reducing since the frontier m 0 is moving upward. In this case, the share of …rms that are supplying in both markets is very high and the number of (m k) active …rms in the single market B is very low; in that case, their bene…t from a deviation is diminishing since their collusion pro…t is growing. One can also underline that the critical discount factor decreases with the number of active …rms in both markets. Paramater k can be considered therefore as a structural factor facilitating collusion in markets 9 . This critical threshold decreases as a function of k. As the number of …rms with contacts in both markets is relatively high, it becomes constant with respect to k since it is equal to~ .
Collusion transfers
Now we make the comparison between both critical discount factors in two previous frameworks: the situation where some …rms are active in both markets (i.e.~ ) and the benchmark case without multimarket contact ( de…ned in section 2). In this …gure, one can distinguish three areas denoted R 1 ,R 2 and R 3 according to the values of parameters. Within locus R 1 and R 3 , multimarket contacts do not increase the incentives for …rms to collude. In both regions, the critical discount factor threshold does not decrease with the number of active …rms in both markets:~ > . In the area R 2 , presence of …rms with contacts in both markets entails more incitations for …rms to collude in market A and also in market B. One can precise these results when market B becomes more competitive (m increases at n given).
As market B is relatively concentrated (m < 2 A + B ), we have~ > (in area R 1 ): no collusion transfer occurs. Indeed initially, without multimarket contact, the critical discount factor is already very low. Active …rms in market B have thus strong incentives to collude since collusion pro…ts are shared between few …rms. In that case, transferring collusion is too costly for active …rms in both markets since they should give up a too large market share in market A but also in market B. In this situation, active …rms in both markets make collusion less sustainable since~ > .
When market B is less concentrated (
, our results show that …rms with contacts in both markets are able to transfer collusion on this market:~ < (area R 2 ). We distinguish between two situations according to values of m: (i) whenever In the case (i) 2 A + B < m < m 0 , market B becomes less concentrated. Individual collusion pro…ts for active …rms in this market are relatively low. In that case, the critical discount factor is de…ned using the incentive constraint for …rms with multimarket contacts. These …rms are then able to transfer collusion at a lower cost giving up a relatively small part of their market share. On the other side, if (ii) m 0 < m < 1 B , the critical discount factor in the multimarket contacts framework is de…ned using the incentive constraint for active …rms in the single-market B (~ =~ B ).
Within the area R 3 , market B is very competitive (m > One can summarize the previous discussion using …gure 3 which represents the variation of the critical discount factor as a function of m when market A is weakly competitive (n < In this …gure, the thick line represents the critical threshold~ for which a collusion transfer is made. More precisely, for n and h given, the …gure shows the market B structure for which …rms with multimarket contacts are able to transfer collusion.
We can now state the following proposition concerning the impact of market-B concentration on the incentives to collude for …rms in market A.
Proposition 2 When market A is weakly competitive (n < This proposition states a relevant result for competition policy. Usually, more market concentration leads to more incentives to collude. Here we show that a reverse result may hold: with multimarket contacts, a weakly competitive adjacent market (A here) relax incentives to collude for …rms competing in others markets (as B).
The intuition of this result is simple. In order to transfer collusion, …rms with multimarket contacts have to give up a signi…cant part of their respective market share for …rms without contact. Then …rms with multimarket contacts may give up a small market share as collusion pro…ts for single-market …rms are low 10 . In that case, …rms with contacts are able to transfer collusion easily. For example, to transfer collusion towards market B (i.e. B high), collusion pro…ts for active …rms in single market B must be weak; this is the case when these …rms are numerous (m k high). The idea is obvious: ability for …rms to transfer collusion depends on their ability to give up market shares that depends on the value of B or on the number of …rms (m k) without contact in market B.
Moreover, one can note that within the "transfer area" R 2 , the di¤erence between both critical factors denoted (m; k) = ~ is not a monotonic function of m. When the market B structure is not very competitive ( 2 A + B < m < m 0 ), the gap (m; k) is increasing in m. In that case, incentives to transfer collusion increase when market B becomes more competitive. On the other hand, as market B is su¢ ciently competitive (m 0 < m < ), incentives to transfers collusion reverse: they decrease with the number of active …rms in market B. It does exist a degree of market concentration in market B for which incentives to transfer collusion are at the maximum level, i.e. when m = m 0 . Last, one can see that this value m 0 is increasing in the number of …rms with contacts in both markets (i.e. k). Figure 4 illustrates how the gap (m; k) varies with m and k.
Figure 4: Collusion Transfers: Sensitivity Analysis
We see in the …gure that when k is growing (k 2 > k 1 ), incentives to transfer collusion are higher for more competitive market B : m 0 is increasing with k. Moreover, one can note that maximum incentives (corresponding to the structure m = m 0 ), are increasing in k.
So far, we have just considered low level of competition in market A (low level of n). When market A is more competitive (n > 10 This collusion pro…t decreases with the number of these …rms.
HHI test and Collusion with Multimarket Contacts
In order to analyze the link between incentives to collude and the degree of market concentration in the situation where k …rms are active in both markets, we …rst calculate the concentration indexes HHI for each area R 1 , R 2 and R 3 depicted in …gure 3.
Hence in areas R 1 and R 2 ; HHI for each market writes:
On the one hand, on can see clearly that HHI h ; h = A; B are decreasing functions 11 of each h . On the other hand, using relation (7) in Lemma 1, we can see that~ B is an increasing function of B whereas~ is a decreasing function of h , h = A; B. Hence, it follows that~ B is a decreasing function of HHI B but~ is an increasing function of HHI in markets A and B.
In the con…guration where market A is weakly competitive (n < 1 A ), we just have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When market B is few concentrated (
, a low HHI level in market A or B corresponds to a market structure which facilitates collusion.
This result reverses the established link between collusion sustainability and index of market concentration (see remarks 1 and 2). In the proposition 3, we show that the analysis of the market structure (HHI test) could generate results in contradiction with results of the analysis of …rms behaviors (collusion test). In particular, whenever m < m 0 , the critical discount factor (which would be the correct but unobservable collusion test) increases whereas HHI decreases. This re ‡ects the situation where more competitive markets A or B could strengthen incentives to collude for some …rms in these markets.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show how the relationship between market concentration and collusive behaviors can be modi…ed when …rms are active on several independent markets (…rms with multimarket contacts). It turns out that in particular market con…gurations, the well-known HHI test could generate results opposite to those obtained with the analysis of market behaviors, particularly the control of collusion.
Concerning the competition policy, three interesting results are underlined. First, the presence of active …rms in both markets could increase incitations to collude. In that case, the concentration index HHI would be calculated on larger relevant markets. It is therefore necessary to analyze other geographical markets on which …rms are active in order to control that 11 Indeed
there is no collusion transfers from a geographic market to another. Second, the entrance of a …rm in a market allows to improve concentration index and to decrease the HHI value. This entrance is therefore very favorable from a structural point of view. However, if this new …rm is also active in a more concentrated market, her entrance in the more competitive market would increase incitations for other …rms to collude. Indeed, this active …rms in both market could give up market shares on her new market in order to incite other …rms to collude. In that case, the entrance of a …rm (decrease of HHI) could give more incitations to collude and could be therefore harmful. Third, the process of concentration on a market could question previous collusive agreements and therefore could be favorable in terms of competition policy. More precisely, if the HHI value is increasing on the more competitive market, active …rms in both markets could have more di¢ culties to incite other …rms to collude. In this context, for a coherent competition policy, it is better to analyze the relative levels of market concentration on which …rms are active and not only absolute HHI level on each independent relevant market. Such a coherent analysis would allow to control the structure of market linked to the control of collusive behaviors of …rms.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. From relation (7) in the text we know that~ = maxf~ ;~ A ;~ B g: Let us
A and study them according to (n; m; k; A ; B ).
First, suppose that m > 
Last if
is decreasing in n and is zero
is decreasing in m and is zero for m = m 0 ,
is monotone increasing in m and is zero for m = 
and thus
As a result of these developments:
Proof of Proposition 2. We just have to show that the low boundary of the subset Y ( A ; B ; k) that is maxfm 0 ; m 1 ; ng is an increasing function of k. We see that Collusion Transfers. We have to give the sign of the di¤erence =~ =~ B .
1. Assume that (n; m) 2 X ( A ; B ; k) and~ =~ . a. If One can de…ne the area R 1 as a subset R 1 X ( A ; B ; k) such that R 1 ( A ; B ; k) = f(n; m) 2 ]k; This allows to de…ne the area R 3 , subset of Y ( A ; B ; k) so that R 3 ( A ; B ; k) = f(n; m) jm > maxf Study of (m; k) in locus R 2 . We denote in the text (m; k) = ~ = . If (n; m) 2 R 2 ( A ; B ; k) and if n < 
